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Cognitive bias has become a popular way to access non-human animal
mood, though inconsistent results have been found. In humans, mood and
personality interact to determine cognitive bias, but to date, this has not
been investigated in non-human animals. Here, we demonstrate for the
first time, to the best of our knowledge, in a non-human animal, the dom-
estic pig (Sus scrofa domesticus), that mood and personality interact,
impacting on judgement. Pigs with a more proactive personality were
more likely to respond optimistically to unrewarded ambiguous probes
(spatially positioned between locations that were previously rewarded and
unrewarded) independent of their housing (or enrichment) conditions. How-
ever, optimism/pessimism of reactive pigs in this task was affected by their
housing conditions, which are likely to have influenced their mood state.
Reactive pigs in the less enriched environment were more pessimistic and
those in the more enriched environment, more optimistic. These results
suggest that judgement in non-human animals is similar to humans, incor-
porating aspects of stable personality traits and more transient mood states.1. Introduction
Information processing in humans is known to be pessimistically biased by a
negative mood, with a greater expectation of a worse outcome when confronted
with ambiguous stimuli [1–4]. By analogy, biases in judgement or cognitive
biases have become a popular way to access non-human animal moods
[5–8]. Animals in a more positive mood state show ‘optimistic’ biases,
characterized by responding to ambiguous stimuli as though they predicted a
positive outcome. Conversely, animals in a negative mood show ‘pessimistic’
biases, responding to ambiguous stimuli as if anticipating a negative outcome.
If such processes in human and non-human animals operate similarly, then
mood is predicted to interact with personality to determine cognitive bias.
Here, we test the hypothesis that mood and personality interact to influence
cognitive bias in the domestic pig. The pigs were housed in one of two environ-
ments known to influence their mood [9]. Mood, defined as ‘relatively enduring
affective states that arise when negative or positive experience in one context or
time period alters the individual’s threshold for responding to potentially
negative or positive events in subsequent contexts or time periods’ [10,
p. R712], can be affected by the environment [11], with better environments
assumed to induce better moods. In contrast, personality is defined as a set
of consistent individual differences in behaviour across contexts and time
[12]. In pigs, personality is frequently measured, using the coping styles
approach [13,14]. Proactivity, at one end of the coping style spectrum, is charac-
terized by more active behavioural responses and less flexible behaviour [15].
test area
NP
M
N
NN
start boxcamera
sliding door
rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org
2
 on January 23, 2017http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from Conversely, reactivity indicates more flexible but more pas-
sive behaviour. Proactivity/reactivity has been linked to
extraversion and neuroticism personality traits in humans.
A tendency towards optimism in humans is linked with
extraversion, and pessimism with neuroticism [16] and thus
may also influence judgement in other animals. We predicted
that proactive pigs would respond optimistically in the cogni-
tive bias task, regardless of their housing conditions (and
inferred mood state), but reactive pigs would be affected by
their housing conditions (and inferred mood state).P
Figure 1. Cognitive bias training and testing arena. N, negative unrewarded
location; NN, near negative probe location; M, middle probe location; NP, near
positive probe location; P, positive rewarded location.
Biol.Lett.12:201604022. Material and methods
(a) Animal housing and husbandry
Weaned at four weeks, 36 pigs (commercial crossbreed PIC337
(large white  landrace), n ¼ 24 males, n ¼ 12 females) were
assigned (pseudo-randomly controlling for sex, weight and
dam) to either a high- or low-level enriched environment in two
groups of 18, replicated three times. Six pigs from each environ-
ment and replicate were selected for training. Both environments
had solid floors, a slatted area and wooden blocks on chains as
enrichment. More enriched environments had deep straw and a
larger space allowance (more enriched: 0.62 m2 pig21; less
enriched: 0.41 m2 pig21). Pigs received an ad libitum conventional
diet, with artificial lighting 12 h daily and natural light through
windows. Ventilation and temperature were automatically con-
trolled (288C decreasing 0.58C daily to 198C). Personality testing
occurred at six and eight weeks of age; cognitive bias training
and testing was completed by 7–10 weeks of age.
(b) Cognitive bias testing
Pigs were habituated to feeding from a bowl in a test arena
(figure 1). After habituation, a false-bottom bowl was used, con-
taining three sugar-coated chocolate sweets and coffee beans to
minimize use of olfactory cues. Pigs were trained to associate
bowl location with a positive or negative outcome; the positive
(P) location in one corner of the arena contained a reward of
three sweets, and in the opposite corner, the negative (N)
location contained three coffee beans. The location of P/N was
pseudo-randomly allocated and counterbalanced over the
environmental treatments for each individual. Training pro-
gressed from presentations of P, N, P to 5P and 4N in random
order, with just one bowl present in each trial. The criteria for
learning the task were 80% ‘success’, defined by approaching
location P within 30 s and not approaching location N
within 30 s. All pigs reached criterion except for nine who
failed to habituate (total n ¼ 27, 17 male and 10 female;
12 better environment and 15 worse environment). Two tests
were conducted per pig, with bowls in three intermediate
probe locations (near positive, NP; middle, M; near negative,
NN). These were presented in a pseudo-randomized order
once per test with the proviso that the M probe was always the
first ambiguous probe presented, between ‘recap’ presentations
at P and N locations, resulting in nine trials per test (e.g. P, N,
M, N, P, NN, P, N, NP). Ambiguous probes were unrewarded
but locations P and N contained either sweets or coffee beans,
as in training. Pigs were given 30 s to approach the probe after
which they were returned to the start box for the next trial.
Time to approach the probe was recorded from the point when
all four feet were outside the start box.
(c) Personality testing
For a social isolation (SI) test, pigs were placed individually
in a pen (l  w  h: 2.2  1.7  1.2 m) away from the homeenvironment, where they remained for 3 min without disturb-
ance. After SI test 1, each pig received a 5-min habituation
period in the novel object (NO) arena.
On the days following SI tests 1 and 2, pigs participated in an
NO test. They were released from a start box (l  w  h: 1 
11.2 m) through a sliding wooden door after 1 min into the
arena (l  w  h: 3.6  21.2 m). A large white bucket and an
orange traffic cone were NOs, presented in a pseudo-randomized
(across tests, with only one being presented in each test) and
counterbalanced (across environments) order. Pigs were given
2 min to enter the arena from the start box. After entering the
arena, the door to the start box was closed and an NO was low-
ered into the middle of the arena on a rope until it was 10 cm
from the ground. Once the object was in its final position, the
NO test started and lasted for 5 min.
Both test areas and start boxes had plywood walls and con-
crete floors, which were cleaned between tests and deep cleaned
between testing pigs from different pens. Pigs were tested in a
randomized order between pens. Within pens, pigs were tested
sequentially to minimize disruption to the rest of the pen.
Video cameras filmed the tests from above, and duration of
standing, exploring, locomotion and line crossing (measure of
activity) in both tests was subsequently recorded. In the NO
test, latency to contact the object and duration of contact with
the NO were also recorded.(d) Statistical analysis
To assess personality, repeatability of the behaviours measu-
red in the SI and NO tests was tested using the intraclass
correlation coefficient. Proactivity–reactivity (P–R) scores were
then calculated from the repeatable behaviours (SI tests: duration
standing and exploring; and NO tests: duration of standing,
exploring and latency to approach the NO). The P–R scores
were calculated as the mean of the z-scores of repeatable
behavioural measures ([14] has full details of this), with Cron-
bach’s alpha used to measure internal consistency. Only data
from the first cognitive bias test were used owing to a decreased
latency to approach NP and increased latency to approach NN in
test 2 relative to test 1, which was considered evidence of
learning such that the probe stimuli may no longer be
ambiguous. To standardize for differences in speed of running
between individuals, a standardized time to run was created:
1 ððTi  TPÞ=ðTmax  TPÞÞ where T is time to run, on the ith
probe trial or to P. TP indicates mean time per individual to
reach location P and Tmax is maximum time per individual
to reach location P. A standardized score of 0 indicates the pig
is treating the probe like location N; a score of 1 indicates it is
treating the probe like location P. Scores of above 1 are possible
if Ti is faster than TP.
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likelihood was used to analyse log ‘time to run’ as the outcome
variable (using lme in nlme package [17]). Individual differences
were accounted for as models were weighted by speed of
approach to location P, pig and pen identity were included as
random effects, P–R scores were covariate and the fixed effects
were: treatment (environment), sex and probe location. Fixed
effects were dropped if they did not influence model fit, assessed
using ANOVA. Sex was dropped from the final model for
this reason.
Three post hoc mixed-effects models were fitted, one for
each probe location. Personality (P–R rank) and environment
were included as fixed effects, pen was a random effect and
models were weighted by time to approach location P. All
analyses were conducted using R [18]. Full analysis, with
data and R script are available in electronic supplementary
material, S1.0.2
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Figure 2. (a– c) Latency to approach (standardized per individual) unre-
warded probes (spatially positioned between locations that were previously
rewarded and unrewarded) in a cognitive bias test in more proactive and reac-
tive pigs. Higher standardized time ran scores indicate greater optimism. More
proactive personalities were more likely to respond optimistically to unre-
warded ambiguous probes. Reactive pigs’ optimism/pessimism was affected
by their housing conditions. (Online version in colour.)
01604023. Results and discussion
We profiled personality in all 36 pigs. High internal reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.858) of the repeatable behaviours
allowed them to be combined to create the P–R scores for
each individual. Lower scores on the P–R index indicate
more reactive pigs and higher scores more proactive.
In humans, information processing biases are dependent
on both current mood state and personality [16,17]. Here,
we find an analogous effect on cognitive bias in pigs.
The speed of approach to the probe locations was signifi-
cantly affected by an interaction between the location of
the probe, personality (rank on P–R scale) and housing
environment (which is likely to have affected mood;
LMM weighted by individual approach to location P
and with pig ID and pen as random effects: t42.7 ¼22.92,
p ¼ 0.005). Separate analyses on the interaction term
revealed that there was no difference between the environ-
ments in pigs’ speed of approach to the ‘near positive’
probe (LMM weighted by approach to location P and pen
as a random effect: t21.8 ¼ 1.37, p ¼ 0.183), or effect of person-
ality (t20.6 ¼ 0.97, p ¼ 0.345, figure 2a). To the ‘near negative’
and ‘middle’ probes, there was an interactive effect of environ-
ment and personality (near negative: t18¼ 2.38, p ¼ 0.028;
middle: t23.6 ¼ 2.40, p ¼ 0.025); pigs in the more enriched
environment were more optimistic if they were more reactive.
However, pigs in the less enriched environment became
more pessimistic to the near negative probe if they had a
more reactive personality (figure 2b,c).
Because proactive pigs behaved differently from reactive
pigs, these findings could explain some of the inconsistent
results between animal cognitive bias tests [19]. Accounting
for personality differences between individuals may reduce
some of this otherwise unexplained variation, making
cognitive bias test outcomes more reliable and robust.
Proactive pigs were less flexible in their response to
probes. This fits with existing knowledge about the low flexi-
bility in proactive animals [13]. The reactive pigs were more
influenced by their housing environment. Those living in a
worse environment were more pessimistic and those in a
better environment were more optimistic. Importantly,
this finding demonstrates that humans are not unique in
combining longer-term personality biases with shorter-
term mood biases in judging stimuli [20]. Optimistic and
pessimistic responses can both be adaptive depending onthe environment [10,21], allowing appropriate responses to
reward or threat signals, respectively. The presence of auto-
correlated variation in the occurrence of environmental
events or in an individual’s own state makes fine-scale
tuning of responses to cues through the mood system advan-
tageous in comparison with a fixed threshold response
system [10]. Therefore, personality and mood jointly
influencing an individual’s behaviour allows longer-term
consistency with shorter-term flexibility for responses to
dynamic conditions.
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